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PROSECUTORS, PAROLE, AND EVIDENCE:
WHY EXCLUDING PROSECUTORS FROM
PAROLE HEARINGS WILL IMPROVE
CALIFORNIA’S PAROLE PROCESS
E. Alex Murcia*

This Article considers whether excluding prosecutors from parole
hearings will improve or compromise California’s parole process. The
Article begins by discussing the role that California law carves out for
prosecutors at parole hearings. Next, it addresses (1) the consequences
of that role and (2) Los Angeles County District Attorney George Gascón’s decision to bar Los Angeles County prosecutors from attending parole hearings. The Article concludes that excluding prosecutors from parole hearings will probably reduce the amount of unhelpful and
unreliable evidence introduced at parole hearings. The Article also finds
that not enough evidence exists to determine whether victims benefit from
increased prosecutorial participation in the parole process. The Article
also conducts an analysis of statistical data maintained by the California
Board of Parole Hearings and, based on that data and other evidence,
finds that excluding prosecutors from parole hearings will probably increase parole release rates in California. The Article reaches the
broader conclusion that excluding prosecutors from parole hearings will
improve California’s parole system.

* J.D., LMU Loyola Law School; B.A., Chapman University. Thank you, Professors Chris
Hawthorne and Elie Miller, for your edits and guidance. Thanks also to the staff of the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review for diligently editing this work.
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT’S GOING ON IN THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE?
After his swearing in as Los Angeles County District Attorney in
December 2020, George Gascón instituted a laundry list of reforms to
the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office through multiple,
sweeping Special Directives.1 Among other things, the unprecedented
changes barred prosecutors from charging gang and gun enhancements,2 from contesting resentencing in many cases,3 and from charging juveniles as adults.4 In 2022, Gascón walked back some of these
reforms, but most, including those referenced below, remain in place.5
In the Special Directives, Gascón also issued three instructions
related to parole (the “Parole Directives”), which limited the role Los
Angeles County prosecutors could play in the parole process. First, he
instructed prosecutors not to appear at parole suitability hearings for
persons serving life sentences—commonly referred to as “lifer parole
hearings.”6 Second, he ordered prosecutors to submit letters supporting parole if at the time of the parole suitability hearing the inmate had
served the mandatory minimum period of incarceration.7 Third, he
permitted prosecutors to submit neutral letters to the Board of Parole
Hearings (the “Board”) if the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation determined that an inmate posed a high risk for recidivism.8 These new instructions significantly reduced the role that
prosecutors play in the parole process. The changes were also a departure from the policies of Gascón’s predecessors, who often expected
prosecutors to submit letters opposing parole and to attend lifer parole
1. Inside LADA, L.A. CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., https://web.archive.org/web/20210227004
941/https:/da.lacounty.gov/about/Inside-LADA (archived Feb. 27, 2021) (listing Special Directives 20-06, 20-07, 20-08.1, 20-08.2, 20-09, 20-10, 20-11, 20-12, 20-13, 20-14).
2. GEORGE GASCÓN, L.A. CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., SPECIAL DIRECTIVE 20-08.2, at 1
(2020), https://da.lacounty.gov/sites/default/files/policies/SD-20-08-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5BFVRB6] (referencing CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53).
3. GEORGE GASCÓN, L.A. CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., SPECIAL DIRECTIVE 20-14, at 4
(2020), https://da.lacounty.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/SPECIAL-DIRECTIVE-20-14.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/Y2GG-XEEN].
4. GEORGE GASCÓN, L.A. CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., SPECIAL DIRECTIVE 20-09, at 3
(2020), https://da.lacounty.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/SPECIAL-DIRECTIVE-20-09.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/3XJA-HRJP].
5. James Queally, George Gascón Wouldn’t Compromise, Until He Did. Now, No One Is
Happy, L.A. TIMES (March 3, 2022, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-0303/george-gascon-wound-not-compromise-then-he-did [https://perma.cc/NX58-28G2].
6. See GASCÓN, supra note 3, at 8.
7. Id.
8. See id.
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hearings to advocate against release.9 The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office justified the Parole Directives on the grounds
that “the value of a prosecutor’s input in [a] parole hearing [is] . . .
limited[,]”10 so prosecutors need not attend.
After publishing the Parole Directives on December 8, 2020, Gascón has faced pushback and criticism from victims’ rights groups and
other California district attorneys,11 including former Los Angeles
County District Attorney Steve Cooley.12 Los Angeles County Sheriff
Alex Villanueva also criticized Gascón, and in early 2021 sent a letter
to the District Attorney’s Office stating that the Sheriff’s Department
would send deputy sheriffs to parole hearings if prosecutors refused to
attend.13
By contrast, criminal justice reform advocates mostly cheer the
Parole Directives and criticized Gascón’s opponents for trying to slow
or prevent Gascón from implementing the reforms.14 Like the District
Attorney’s Office, many in this group argued that the Parole Directives would positively impact the parole process because, they
claimed, prosecutors do not contribute meaningfully at parole hearings
and, therefore, should play a lesser role in them.15
9. See Chris Kaiser-Nyman, (In)Justice in LA, ACLU CAL. 39–40 (Dec. 4, 2020),
https://www.lareentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2020-ACLU-LADA-Report-.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/NS3M-7E8W].
10. GASCÓN, supra note 3, at 8 (emphasis added).
11. Ben Poston, Victims Rights Advocates Launch Recall Effort Against Newly Elected L.A.
Dist. Atty. George Gascón, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2021, 7:41 PM), https://www.latimes.com/cali
fornia/story/2021-02-27/group-plans-to-launch-recall-effort-against-newly-elected-l-a-dist-atty-ge
orge-gascon [https://perma.cc/ZL6D-GVBP]; Jeremy B. White, California Prosecutors Revolt
Against Los Angeles DA’s Social Justice Changes, POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2021, 4:30 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/25/george-gascon-california-social-justice-461667 [https
://perma.cc/LC66-W4SR].
12. Anabel Munoz, Steve Cooley on Reforms by LA County DA George Gascón: ‘Basically I
Disagree with Virtually Everything He’s Doing,’ ABC7 NEWS (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://abc7.com/steve-cooley-george-gascon-da-district-attorney/8650550/ [https://perma.cc/MS
9A-HCGK].
13. See LA County Sheriffs (@LASDHQ), TWITTER (Feb. 3, 2021, 9:14 AM), https://twitt
er.com/LASDHQ/status/1357014686022078464 [https://perma.cc/H4TH-48HT]; see Letter from
Alex Villanueva, Sheriff, L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, to George Gascón, District Attorney, L.A.
Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Off. (Feb. 3, 2021), https://lasd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Transparency
_Response_Gascon_Letter_Parole_Hearings_020321.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8MC-PR53].
14. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Miriam Aroni Krinsky, Opinion, Stop the Attempt to Derail
D.A. George Gascón’s Criminal Justice Reforms, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2021, 3:05 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2021-01-28/george-gascon-los-angeles-district-attorney-l
awsuit [https://perma.cc/U94V-9578].
15. GASCÓN, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that the value of a prosecutor’s input in parole hearings
is limited); Editorial, No, Crime Survivors Don’t Need Prosecutors at Parole Hearings. But They
Do Need More Help, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2021, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opini
on/story/2021-02-21/prosecutors-parole-hearings-gascon [https://perma.cc/CQA2-65TM].
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Setting aside the vigorous disagreement on these issues, this Article conducts an empirical analysis of whether prosecutors serve a
beneficial role when they oppose parole and attend parole hearings.
Specifically, the Article considers (1) the role that California law
carves out for prosecutors at parole hearings16 and (2) the ultimate
consequences of that role.17 The Article’s analysis of the latter includes consideration of (a) how prosecutorial participation in parole
impacts victim attendance at parole hearings,18 (b) whether prosecutorial involvement in the parole process impacts the Board’s parole grant
rate,19 (c) how prosecutorial participation affects the evidence that
reaches the Board at hearings,20 (d) whether prosecutorial participation in parole benefits victims,21 and (e) how sending prosecutors to
parole hearings impacts the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s
Office.22 Last, the Article considers whether sending Los Angeles
County deputy sheriffs to parole hearings—as Sheriff Alex Villanueva
has promised to do—will negate the effects of Gascón’s reforms.23
After reviewing the evidence, the Article concludes that substantial evidence supports the claim that prosecutors do not serve a beneficial role in the parole process.24 As a result, reducing prosecutors’
roles in that process will probably improve it.
One important point to note before we continue. This Article’s
inquiry into prosecutorial involvement in parole covers only the type
of prosecutorial conduct authorized by California law. The Article
does not discuss whether prosecutors serve valuable roles in the parole
process when their roles differ meaningfully from the functions they
perform under California’s parole scheme. Note also that any references in this Article to “the Board” refer to the California Board of
Parole Hearings. Any references to the “parole board” or “parole
boards” refer to parole boards more generally.

16. See discussion infra Section II.A.
17. See discussion infra Part III.
18. See discussion infra Section III.A.1.
19. See discussion infra Section III.A.
20. See discussion infra Section III.B.
21. See discussion infra Section III.D.
22. See discussion infra Section III.E.
23. See discussion infra Section III.F. This final issue carries particular importance. If prosecutors negatively impact the parole process and Sheriff Villanueva’s deputies attend parole hearings their place, Gascón’s policy on parole will probably have less of an impact.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
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II. BACKGROUND: WHAT DO PROSECUTORS DO AT PAROLE
HEARINGS?
A. Representatives of the State
In the pretrial phase of the criminal legal system, prosecutors have
broad discretion to decide whether to charge a defendant, what crimes
to charge, and what pleas to offer.25 By contrast, when prosecutors
participate in the parole process, they play a much smaller role.
Section 2030 of the California Code of Regulations governs prosecutors who attend parole hearings on behalf of the state.26 The section
permits but does not require a prosecutor from the office that prosecuted the inmate to appear at the inmate’s parole suitability hearing.27
Section 2030 authorizes a prosecutor who attends a parole hearing to
“comment on the facts of the case and present an opinion about the
appropriate disposition.”28 Although prosecutors may be permitted to
ask clarifying questions,29 they must direct their questions to the
Board.30 The Board may then redirect questions to the inmate.31 Section 3043.6 of the California Penal Code provides prosecutors the
power to speak last at parole hearings,32 and section 3041.7 bars persons other than prosecutors from representing the state of California
at parole hearings.33 In lieu of an appearance, prosecutors may express
their opinions on inmate parole suitability through written letters.34

25. Prosecutorial Discretion: The Decision to Charge, NAT’L INST. L. ENF’T & CRIM. JUST.
9 (Oct. 1975), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/30983NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D
XQ-ZNRS].
26. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2030 (2020).
27. Id.
28. Id. §§ 2028, 2030.
29. Id. § 2030(d)(2).
30. See Scott v. Haviland, No. CIV S-09-2830, 2012 WL 893177, at *12–13 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 14, 2012).
31. See, e.g., id. at *13.
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3043.6 (West 2011). No empirical literature has explored the impact
of this provision, but I speculate that it results in the Board assigning more weight to the testimony
of a prosecutor in an assessment of whether to grant parole. Support for this hypothesis stems from
the recency effect. Cf. Elizabeth Hopper, What Is the Recency Effect in Psychology?, THOUGHTCO.
(Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/recency-effect-4691883 [https://perma.cc/BVU5-B
Q2N] (explaining the recency effect).
33. PENAL § 3041.7.
34. REGS. tit. 15, § 2030 (addressing prosecutor’s power to submit documents); PENAL
§§ 1203.01, 3042 (same); 49 CAL. JUR. 3D Penal and Correctional Institutions § 294 (2018 &
Supp. 2021); cf. Lopez v. Green, No. F069010, 2015 WL 4162509, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. July 10,
2015) (discussing letters submitted by prosecutors to the parole board).
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A prosecutor who attends a parole hearing and who opposes release might argue to the Board that the inmate is not suitable for parole
because he or she minimizes his or her role in the crime, lies about the
crime, or shows a lack of remorse.35 A prosecutor might also point to
facts about the crime or the inmate’s disciplinary record in prison to
argue that the prisoner still poses a danger to society and is not suitable
for release.36 Where prosecutors support release, they often point to
positive facts about the inmate’s background or the inmate’s rehabilitation.37
However, prosecutors who appear on behalf of the state rarely
support release.38 In fact, as the quote below demonstrates, some prosecutors oppose release despite acknowledging that an inmate appears
to be suitable for parole.
Even while opposing petitioner’s release, . . . the district attorney admitted, “I would again indicate that I believe [the
inmate has] made as much progress as any inmate I’ve seen
since I’ve been doing these parole hearings. Both in terms of
advancing educationally, doing the self-help and also setting
up very solid parole and probation plans.’
. . . [The district attorney also acknowledged that the petitioner was] “as impressive an individual as [he had] seen in
terms of evidencing a changed attitude . . . .”39
The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office does not keep
official records on the rate at which its prosecutors oppose parole when
appearing under section 2030.40 However, insiders estimate that under
35. See, e.g., In re Padin, No. A151770, 2018 WL 1063913, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27,
2018) (prosecutor argued that the Board should deny parole because “the version of the facts . . .
[inmate presented] ‘minimize[d] his role in the crime’ . . . and constituted a ‘sanitized minimization
version [of events] that amount[ed] to a snow job,’ a ‘bald, flat-out lie’”).
36. See, e.g., In re Parole Consideration Hearing of Harvey Amezcua at 60:14–17, 61:1–13,
CDC No. V69723 (Pelican Bay State Prison Nov. 3, 2020) (questioning inmates’ suitability for
release in part because that inmate was a “dry drunk . . . [who had not] really program[ed], . . .
chose college courses over his sobriety,” and had a poor disciplinary record in prison).
37. See, e.g., In re Parole Consideration Hearing of Brian Allen at 65:16–25, 66:1–2, CDC
No. J6200 (Cal. Men’s Colony Nov. 20, 2020) (“[I]t appears to this prosecutor that, um, Mr. Allen
has spent the last decade, um, really programming well, really digging deep into his, um, background and to try and understand [sic] . . . how his addiction drove his behaviors along with his,
um, character defects. And, um, it would appear that given the, uh, regulations in effect today,
the . . . ability to, and expectation to rehabilitate oneself in CDCR that Mr. Allen has, um, achieved
that, that he has done well. And we commend him for his, um, good program over the last decade.”).
38. See Kaiser-Nyman, supra note 9, at 39–40.
39. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Subia, No. 07-cv-00839, 2010 WL 2025330, at *14 (E.D. Cal.
May 18, 2010) (emphasis added).
40. Kaiser-Nyman, supra note 9, at 39–40.
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the previous District Attorney, Jackie Lacey, prosecutors opposed parole in about 80 percent of cases.41 Other District Attorneys in California—who are often more politically conservative—likely oppose
parole at even higher rates.42
B. Speaking for Victims
Prosecutors who attend parole hearings may also present victim
statements to the Board.43 Crime victims, family members of crime
victims, and victims’ next of kin may speak at parole hearings or have
written statements read into the record by third parties.44 Prosecutors
may read these statements.45
The statutory basis for prosecutors to speak at parole hearings on
behalf of victims arises, in part, from prosecutors’ rights to appear before the Board under section 2030.46 However, the rights of prosecutors to represent the views of victims stems from the Penal Code, specifically sections 3043 and 3043.2. Section 3043 permits victims to
designate any adult person to appear as a personal representative at a
parole suitability hearing to comment upon (1) the inmate’s suitability
for release, (2) the effect of the crime on the victim, or (3) other crimes
committed by the inmate.47 Courts cite section 3043 as providing a
statutory basis for a prosecutor to attend a parole hearing.48
Section 3043.2 also provides a basis for prosecutors to speak on
behalf of victims at parole hearings. While section 3043.2 begins by
describing a more limited definition of personal representative, one
that bars nonfamily members from presenting certain kinds of evidence to the board, the statute notes that this stricter definition of personal representatives does not “prohibit prosecutors from representing . . . the views of . . . victim[s]” at parole hearings.49
41. Id.
42. Cf. Julissa Zavala, Meet the Candidates: District Attorney, THE SENTINEL (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://hanfordsentinel.com/election2018/meet-the-candidates-district-attorney/article_76caec8c0c16-5dfe-b2db-c760822c0bc6.html [https://perma.cc/GPL5-QW49] (quoting the Kings County
district attorney as claiming his office “ensure[d] personal prosecutor appearance for all parole
hearings for violent criminals”).
43. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3043(c) (West 2011).
44. Id. § 3043.6.
45. See infra note 51.
46. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2030 (2020).
47. PENAL § 3043(b)(1), (c).
48. See In re Weider, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 147, 161 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing section 3043 in connection with a district attorney’s presence at a parole hearing).
49. PENAL § 3043.2.
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When prosecutors attend parole hearings to state the position of
the victim, prosecutors may point to reasons voiced by the victim, including the victim’s opinion on the inmate’s parole suitability, as a
basis to deny or grant parole.50 Notably, a victim need not appear at
the hearing for a prosecutor to read a statement drafted by the victim,
a family member of the victim, or the victim’s next of kin.51
III. ANALYSIS: WHAT IMPACT DO PROSECUTORS HAVE WHEN THEY
OPPOSE PAROLE AND SUBMIT/READ VICTIM STATEMENTS
A. Prosecutors Probably Have an Impact on Parole Rates
The first question that this Article considers is whether a prosecutor’s attendance at a parole hearing or submission of written evidence to the parole board has any measurable impact on parole board
decisions.
No empirical studies directly address whether a prosecutor’s attendance at a parole hearing impacts release rates.52 Accordingly, the
first of the following two subsections discusses other conditions
known to influence the outcomes of parole hearings. The same subsection then considers whether including prosecutors in the parole process alters those conditions and makes parole boards more or less
likely to grant or deny parole. The second subsection considers
whether prosecutors influence parole board decisions through the political process. The third subsection conducts an analysis of the
Board’s parole rate to determine whether the Parole Directives have
already impacted release rates in Los Angeles.
1. Studies Show That Prosecutors Probably Impact Parole Rates
Victim involvement in the parole process influences the rate at
which parole boards grant parole. Studies show that where victims
participate in the parole process by attending parole hearings or submitting statements to parole boards, parole boards deny parole in a
greater percentage of cases.
50. See id. §§ 3041.5(b)(1)–(3), 3043(c).
51. See id. § 3043.2. When I corresponded with California district attorneys’ offices over the
phone regarding their parole hearing policies, representatives from multiple offices stated that their
offices send prosecutors to read victim statements into the record where victims decline to attend
or exercise their right to attend but decline to speak. No offices were willing to provide me with a
written policy. Some also declined to make a statement on the record.
52. R. Michael Cassidy, Undue Influence: A Prosecutor’s Role in Parole Proceedings, 16
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 293, 302 (2019).
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For example, a detailed study of the Alabama parole process determined that the parole board denied parole more frequently when
victims submitted written statements or spoke at parole hearings.53
The study also found that if the victim spoke at a parole hearing, the
parole board denied parole with even greater frequency than if the victim submitted only a written statement.54 A 1992 study conducted in
Pennsylvania also found that victim participation in the parole process
decreased release rates. Specifically, the study determined that where
victims attended parole hearings, the Pennsylvania Parole Board denied parole in 43 percent of cases.55 When victims did not attend, the
Pennsylvania Parole Board granted parole in 93 percent of cases.56
In another study, which surveyed releasing authorities about the
impact of victim input on their decisions, researchers found that 40
percent of the authorities considered victim testimony to be “highly
influential” in determining whether to release.57 An analysis of release
rates in California showed that the Board’s release rate in the mid2000s dropped from 13.8 percent to just 5 percent when victims attended parole hearings.58 These studies provide strong evidence that
when victims attend parole hearings or submit written statements to
parole boards, parole boards release fewer inmates.
The findings of the studies carry significance for this Article because when prosecutors attend parole hearings, they likely increase
victim participation in the parole process. For example, some district
attorneys’ offices in California provide transportation or
53. Kathryn Morgan & Brent L. Smith, Victims, Punishment, and Parole: The Effect of Victim
Participation on Parole Hearings, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 333, 341, 351 (2005).
54. Id. at 339–40.
55. See William H. Parsonage et al., Victim Impact Testimony and Pennsylvania’s Parole Decision Making Process: A Pilot Study, 6 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 187, 194 (1992) (finding that the
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole denied parole in just 7 percent of cases where victims
did not provide testimony at parole hearings and denied parole in 43 percent of cases where victims
testified to the Board).
56. See id.
57. See Maureen McLeod, Getting Free: Victim Participation in Parole Board Decisions, 4
CRIM. J. 12, 41–43 (1989) (parole board personnel estimated that denial rates rose 30 percent when
victims participated in the parole process); cf. Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime Victim:
Evaluating Victim Input at Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME & JUST. 347, 397, 402 (2009) (citing
SUSAN C. KINNEVY & JOEL M. CAPLAN, CTR. FOR RSCH. ON YOUTH & SOC. POL’Y, FINDINGS
FROM THE APAI INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF RELEASING AUTHORITIES 18 (2008),
http://www.apaintl.org/_documents/surpub/2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX33-N2HJ]) (discussing
how victim testimony may impact board decisions).
58. Robert Weisberg et al., Life in Limbo: An Examination of Parole Release for Prisoners
Serving Life Sentences with the Possibility of Parole in California, STAN. CRIM. JUST. CTR.
(Sept. 2011), https://law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication/259833/doc/slspublic/SCJC%
20Lifer%20Parole%20Release%20Sept%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LDF-UR7M].
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accommodations for victims seeking to attend parole hearings with
prosecutors.59 Where victims do not attend hearings with prosecutors,
district attorneys’ offices allow victims to appear and speak via video
from the prosecutor’s office.60 Deputy district attorneys may also read
victim statements into the record.61
Therefore, prosecutorial involvement in the parole process probably increases victim participation because prosecutors provide ways
for victims, many of whom live far from the prisons where the California Department of Corrections holds parole hearings, to comment
at parole hearings when those victims otherwise could not. Prosecutors
also increase participation by victims when they help victims navigate
the procedural hurdles required to get statements to the Board.
The evidence discussed above shows that greater prosecutorial
involvement in the parole process likely increases victim involvement,
which increases denial rates.

59. I contacted multiple California district attorneys’ offices about their policies concerning
parole hearings. While some declined to discuss this issue on the record, other offices indicated
that they provide the above-mentioned services for victims. No offices maintained a written policy
on the provision of these services.
60. See A Guide for Writing Victim Impact Statements, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.,
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/victim-services/a-guide-for-writing-victim-impact-statements/ [https://pe
rma.cc/578Z-TX4W] (“You can also submit an audio or video statement (with transcript), appear
via video conference at the DA’s office, or have someone speak on your behalf.”).
61. Representatives from several counties stated that deputy district attorneys read victim testimony to the Board when victims decline to attend hearings. Others declined to comment. Section
3043.2 also makes clear that deputy district attorneys may represent the views of victims to the
parole board. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3043.2(c) (West 2011). As for why prosecutors reading victim
statements into the record will decrease release rates, two sources of evidence support this conclusion. First, the Alabama study showed that where victims appeared and spoke to the parole board,
the parole board denied parole at a higher rate than when victims merely submitted written statement; nonetheless, written statements still decreased release rates. Morgan & Smith, supra note 53,
at 351. Second, other research shows that when people hear another person, any person, read a
statement, they assign more intelligence, thoughtfulness, and other human qualities to the speaker
and his or her opinions than if the hearer merely reads the statement to themselves. See Juliana
Schroeder & Nicholas Epley, The Sound of Intellect: Speech Reveals a Thoughtful Mind, Increasing
a Job Candidate’s Appeal, 26 PSYCH. SCI. 877, 881–82 (2015) (finding that hearing the voices of
job candidates caused hearers to rate them as more competent, thoughtful, and intelligent); cf. Juliana Schroeder et al., The Humanizing Voice: Speech Reveals, and Text Conceals, a More Thoughtful Mind in the Midst of Disagreement, 28 PSYCH. SCI. 1745, 1749 (2017) (finding that hearing an
opinion, instead of merely reading one, results in the hearer assigning more human qualities to the
person who holds the opinion). Accordingly, the fact that someone read the victims’ statements to
the parole board, not that the victim read them, likely accounts for the greater increase in denial
rates that occurred when Alabama victims attended parole hearings. This means that when prosecutors read statements to the Board, prosecutors likely have a similar effect to victims reading
statements.
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2. Prosecutors Exert Political Pressure on Parole Boards
When prosecutors appear at parole hearings to object to the release of high-profile offenders, they likely contribute to further reductions in release rates. Parole board commissioners in the United States
know that every time they release an inmate, the odds increase that a
parolee will re-offend. When an inmate released on parole re-offends
and causes harm, parole boards often become targets of criticism.
Commissioners may even lose their jobs or discretion as a result.62
For example, in 2019, when the Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole released an inmate who later murdered an eight-year-old
boy, officials immediately criticized the board and called for changes
to the state’s parole process.63 Similarly, when the Oklahoma Pardon
and Parole Board released a man who later killed several people, the
Pardon and Parole Board faced backlash and criticism from officials,
including the prosecutor who prosecuted the case.64 Other cases have
resulted in similar pressure on parole boards to tighten standards for
release.65
District attorneys—who often command press attention66—know
about the scrutiny parole boards face. As the Oklahoma case demonstrates, a prosecutor’s office that opposes parole can leverage that

62. See, e.g., Andy Fox, Virginia Parole Board Under Fire for Releasing Convicted Killer,
Family Member Fighting Back, WAVY.COM (Aug. 14, 2020, 7:51 PM), https://www.wavy.com/ne
ws/local-news/suffolk/virginia-parole-board-under-fire-for-releasing-convicted-killer-family-me
mber-fighting-back/ [https://perma.cc/3CKL-44Q2]; John Appleton, Gov. Deval Patrick Cleans
House at Parole Board in Response to the Killing of Woburn Police Officer John Maguire, MASS
LIVE (Mar. 25, 2019, 4:18 AM), https://www.masslive.com/news/2011/01/gov_deval_patrick_cl
eans_house.html [https://perma.cc/N2NZ-2VZF].
63. 6 Killings in Two Months Allegedly by People on Parole in Pennsylvania Prompt Calls
for Review, NBC NEWS (July 25, 2019, 4:43 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/crimecourts/6-killings-two-months-allegedly-people-parole-pennsylvania-prompt-calls-n1034356
[https://perma.cc/C7RV-396E] (quoting officials who pushed for an “independent review” of the
parole board); 8-Year-Old’s Murder Could Change Way Parole Cases Are Handled in PA, WPXI
(Sept. 13, 2019, 4:57 AM), https://www.wpxi.com/news/top-stories/8-year-old-s-murder-couldchange-way-parole-cases-are-handled-in-pa/985703807/ [https://perma.cc/M2PF-RBK3] (quoting
a Pennsylvania District Attorney and state lawmakers who pushed to extend sentences for certain
offenders as a result of the Board’s release of inmate).
64. See Crystal Bonvillian, He ‘Cooked the Heart with Potatoes’: Oklahoma Parolee Charged
in Gruesome Triple Slaying, BOS. 25 NEWS (Feb. 24, 2021, 5:01 PM), https://www.boston25news.com/news/trending/he-cooked-heart-with-potatoes-recent-oklahoma-parolee-chargedgruesome-triple-slaying/XLR7B3O6NRBYZJLGCSL4K5NXJM [https://perma.cc/6K88-6VDF].
65. See supra note 62.
66. See, e.g., supra note 11.
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scrutiny to pressure a parole board to deny release.67 Although researchers have not gathered much empirical data on this issue, anecdotal data shows that prosecutors use these tactics with some frequency. For example, Boston College Law Professor R. Michael
Cassidy identified a list of cases where prosecutors successfully “pressure[d] . . . parole board[s] [to deny parole by submitting] . . . information [to the parole boards] that [was] both irrelevant and inflammatory.”68
One of the more concerning examples discussed by Cassidy involved a prosecutor who attended a parole hearing to insist, without
reliable evidence, that the inmate, who had been in prison for more
than twenty-five years, would “kill again” if released.69
Where prosecutors appear at parole hearings and make blanket
statements like this, it becomes difficult to argue that parole board
commissioners do not become more mindful of the risks associated
with releasing an inmate. As a result, when prosecutors attend parole
hearings and oppose parole, they likely cause parole boards to release
fewer inmates.
3. The Parole Directives May Have Impacted Release Rates Already
George Gascón was elected Los Angeles County District Attorney in November 2020, and the Parole Directives took effect in December of that year.70 Before December 2020, prosecutors from Los
Angeles County attended parole hearings and opposed parole as a matter of course.71 Gascón’s policy change provides a background for this
Article to assess whether the lack of opposition to parole by prosecutors in Los Angeles has already impacted inmate release rates in California.
i. Data used
The following subsections compare the Board’s release rate from
January through June 2020 (Pre-Directives Period One) and July 2020
through November 2020 (Pre-Directives Period Two). These release
67. Cassidy, supra note 52, at 303 (discussing how the testimony of a prosecutor might impact
a parole board’s decision by reminding the board of the politically fraught circumstances they will
face if an inmate is released and goes on to commit another serious crime).
68. Id. at 297–98.
69. Id. at 296–97 (discussing several examples).
70. See discussion supra Part I.
71. See Kaiser-Nyman, supra note 9, at 39–40.
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rates are then compared to the release rate from December 2020
through April 2021 (Post Directives Period). All data used in this analysis was gathered from the Board’s website, compiled by the author,
and organized by the author. The aggregated data remains on file with
the author. The raw data is available on the Board’s website.72
To reduce statistical noise, this analysis does not consider parole
rates for inmates committed in Los Angeles County and another
county (Multi-County Cases). Including Multi-County Cases in the
tally of cases for the Post Directives Period would interfere with data
from that period because prosecutors from other counties may have
attended parole hearings in place of Los Angeles County prosecutors.
Including Multi-County Cases in the Pre-Directives Period would also
skew data because different district attorneys’ offices have different
policies on when and how often to oppose parole. For example, some
district attorneys’ offices may oppose parole in every case, while others may not.73 Therefore, to improve accuracy, the analysis limits itself
to cases involving inmates committed in Los Angeles County only.
Note that this analysis does not consider the outcomes of parole
hearings where inmates waived their rights to a hearing or agreed to
stipulate to denial. It also does not consider the results of parole hearings where hearings were postponed or continued. In such cases, the
Board does not conduct an adjudication of the inmate’s suitability for
parole with a prosecutor’s input. Therefore, prosecutors probably do
not influence the outcomes.74
ii. Results
Data from January through June 2020, Pre-Directives Period
One, showed that the Board denied 68% of requests for release in January, 60% of requests for release in February, 54% of requests for
72. Parole Suitability Hearing Results, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.,
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/parole-suitability-hearing-results [https://perma.cc/977J-LGSR]. If
any records have been removed, then see the Wayback Machine’s archive for earlier records.
WAYBACK MACH., http://web.archive.org/web/2020*/https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/parole-suitab
ility-hearing-results/.
73. See supra Section II.A.
74. With that said, the fact that Los Angeles County prosecutors do not attend parole hearings,
see GASCÓN supra note 3, at 8, may influence inmates’ decisions to seek release or stipulate to
denial. Since the Parole Directives went into effect, more inmates may have declined to stipulate
to unsuitability because the district attorney’s office will not oppose parole. This might have a
variety of impacts on the data—including increasing the denial rate because more unsuitable inmates might apply for parole. This Article recommends that researchers explore this question in the
future, once more data from the Post Directives Period becomes available.
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release in March, 65% of requests for release in April, 43% of requests
for release in May, and 67% of requests for release in June. The overall
denial rate was 60.99% and the average monthly denial rate was
59.53%. For further information on the number of hearings per month
see Figure 1 (Figure 1).
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Figure 1
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In Pre-Directives Period Two, the Board granted parole in 182
cases involving inmates committed in Los Angeles County and denied
285 requests for release. In July of 2020, the denial rate was 68%. The
months of August and September saw the denial rate decline to 48%
and 57%, respectively. In October, the Board denied 63% of requests
for release. In November, the Board denied 59% of requests for release.
In Pre-Directives Period Two, the Board denied 61.03% of all requests for release from inmates committed in Los Angeles County.
The average monthly denial rate was 59.32%. The total number of
hearings per month and the number of parole requests denied and
granted per month is broken down in further detail in Figure 2 (Figure
2).
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Figure 2
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Data for the Post Directives Period showed that in the Post Directives period, the Board granted parole in 220 cases and denied parole in 277 cases. In December 2020, the Board granted 55% of requests for release.75 In January 2021, the Board granted 41% of
requests; in February, it granted 44% of requests. In March and April,
the Board granted 44% of requests for release and 43% of requests,
respectively. The overall denial rate for the Post Directives Period was
55.73% and the average monthly denial rate was 54.71%. The total
number of hearings per month and the number of parole requests denied and granted per month appear in further detail in Figure 3 (Figure
3) below.

75. The Parole Directives took effect on the 10th of December. Hearings that took place from
December 1 until December 10 were not included in this analysis. However, if this data is considered it does not have a meaningful impact on the results. Data on file with author.

(8) 55.2_MURCIA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/5/22 2:05 PM

PROSECUTORS, PAROLE, AND EVIDENCE

459

Figure 3
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iii. Implications
In Pre-Directives Period One, the board denied 60.99% of requests for release. In Pre-Directives Period Two, the Board denied
61.03% of all requests for release. In the Post Directives Period, the
Board denied only 55.73% of requests. Prior to the Parole Directives,
the denial rate remained consistent from January through June 2020
and July through November 2020. Specifically, the denial rate fluctuated by only .04% across two five-month periods in 2020. But from
December 2021 through April 2021—after prosecutors were removed
from the parole process—the parole release rate increased by over 5%.
While the correlation between the increase in release rates and the implementation of the Parole Directives does not show causation, it lends
more support to the evidence discussed in Sections III.A.1 and III.A.2,
which indicate that prosecutorial involvement in the parole process
decreases release rates.
In terms of implications, if the Parole Directives do produce
higher release rates in the long term, they will probably produce at
least some positive impacts for the California criminal legal system.
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court subjected California to a federal
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mandate to reduce its prison population.76 California has since brought
itself into compliance with that order.77 Nonetheless, the population in
many state prisons remains well above capacity.78 An increase in release rates, even if slight, will help reduce overcrowding in state prisons and allow prisons to better rehabilitate inmates.
Just as importantly, the benefits of a drop in the prison population
will not be offset by a meaningful increase in recidivism. Inmates released after serving life sentences must meet a uniform set of requirements before they can become eligible for parole—which helps prevent release of inmates most likely to recidivate.79 Moreover, inmates
released on parole after serving life sentences recidivate at low levels.
In fact, an analysis of 860 California inmates in prison for murder
showed that only five inmates had been convicted for new felonies
after release (a recidivism rate of less than 1 percent, which is less than
the background rate of criminality in the overall population).80 The
same analysis showed that none of these persons recidivated by committing crimes severe enough to warrant another life sentence.81
Given these considerations, we can surmise that if the Parole Directives increase release rates in the long term, that increase will likely
help reduce prison overcrowding without upping the recidivism rate
among parolees.
B. Prosecutors Do Not Necessarily Improve the Reliability of the
Parole Board’s Assessments of Dangerousness
The previous section considered whether prosecutors impact parole board release rates and, briefly, how an increase in release rates
might impact the California state penal system. However, it did not
consider the critical question of whether prosecutors make parole
76. Daniel C. Vock, After Years of Court Orders, California’s Prison Population Finally Hits
Target, GOVERNING (Oct. 2015), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-california-prison-pop
ulation-proposition-47-impact.html [https://perma.cc/Y6PT-XZA5].
77. Id.
78. Heather Harris et al., California’s Prison Population, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. 1 (July
2019), https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/jtf-prison-population-jtf.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7
4Q-F2S6].
79. Lifer Parole Process, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/lifer
-parole-process/ [https://perma.cc/A62P-ENT3].
80. See Weisberg et al., supra note 58, at 17; Alan Furry, Study Estimates U.S. Population
with Felony Convictions, UGA TODAY (Oct. 1, 2017), https://news.uga.edu/total-us-population
-with-felony-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/3LBM-L3SU] (estimating that 3% of the population
has a felony conviction).
81. See Weisberg et al., supra note 58, at 17.

(8) 55.2_MURCIA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

PROSECUTORS, PAROLE, AND EVIDENCE

5/5/22 2:05 PM

461

boards better at determining an inmate’s suitability for release.82 The
Parole Directives derive their justification from the notion that (1)
prosecutors influence the outcomes of parole hearings—by increasing
victim participation or by other means—and (2) that prosecutors do
not improve the parole process when they attend parole hearings.
Therefore, to determine whether the Parole Directives will improve
the parole process itself, we must consider whether prosecutors make
the Board better or worse at performing its duty: to assess inmate suitability for release.
In In re Lawrence,83 the California Supreme Court stated that the
Board must determine inmate suitability by assessing the inmate’s current dangerousness.84 Accordingly, to determine whether prosecutors
improve the Board’s ability to assess dangerousness, the following
section discusses whether prosecutors impact what evidence the Board
uses to assess dangerousness. More specifically, the following subsections consider whether prosecutors increase the volume of reliable evidence that the Board considers when assessing offender dangerousness.
1. Prosecutors Who Present Victim Testimony/Statements
As discussed earlier in the Article, when prosecutors frequently
attend parole hearings and oppose parole, they likely increase the
number of victim statements that reach the Board.85 This raises the
question, does victim testimony or the reading of victim testimony by
prosecutors help the Board make more informed decisions about an
offender’s dangerousness? Unfortunately, it does not.
Victims who attend parole hearings may testify about a variety of
matters related to the inmate’s crime, including how the crime impacted the victim, feelings of forgiveness or anger that the victim holds
towards the inmate, and the inmate’s suitability for parole.86
The first two of these categories of evidence add little to the
Board’s ability to assess an offender’s dangerousness. While often
tragic, the long-term impacts of a crime do not relate to a determination of an inmate’s current dangerousness. The same can be said for
82. Cf. In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 549 (Cal. 2008) (finding that Board’s primary function
is to assess offender dangerousness).
83. 190 P.3d 535 (Cal. 2008).
84. Id.
85. See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3043(b)(1) (West 2011).
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the victim’s feelings of forgiveness or anger.87 Although many victims
experience overwhelming feelings of anger towards offenders, those
feelings do not relate to offender dangerousness.
The third type of commentary—victim opinion on suitability for
release—does not usually help the Board assess dangerousness either.
First, victims do not ordinarily have access to information about an
inmate’s conduct after conviction, so they lack knowledge of many of
the specific facts necessary to assess an offender’s current dangerousness. Second, because they do not have access to the inmate’s prison
and risk assessment files, victims may support release or oppose release while unaware of the offender’s conduct in prison. This fact is
of no small concern. As discussed in Section III.A.1, parole boards
take the opinions of victims seriously. So, where a victim sets forth an
uninformed opinion on an inmate’s parole suitability, the victim creates a risk that he or she will improperly influence the Board. The result might be that the Board refuses to release an inmate who is suitable for parole and, just as troublingly, that the Board releases a
dangerous inmate because of the inmate’s ability to win over the victim.
Another problem with victim testimony at parole hearings is that
it may be unreliable because it does not go through the rigorous process required for the admission of evidence at a trial. Victims, who
include family and next of kin,88 need not have personal knowledge of
facts about which they testify at parole hearings.89 By contrast, in a
criminal trial, the hearsay rule, which exists to keep out unreliable evidence, usually excludes this testimony.90 But even where hearsay
statements enter evidence at trial through a hearsay exception or exemption, defendants can challenge the statements through cross-examination. At parole hearings, inmates may not cross-examine witnesses.91 This, in turn, increases the risk that the Board will use
unreliable evidence to assess inmate dangerousness.
87. To be clear, this Article does not argue that victims should be barred from confronting or
communicating with offenders in other contexts. To the contrary, evidence suggests that restorative
justice initiatives may help victims heal. See Jill Suttie, Can Restorative Justice Help Prisoners to
Heal?, GREATER GOOD MAG. (June 9, 2015), https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/restor
ative_justice_help_prisoners_heal [https://perma.cc/63SA-T832]. However, because of the risk of
prejudice at hearings, this Article takes the position that parole suitability hearings are not suitable
places for victims to confront or communicate with offenders.
88. PENAL § 3043(b)(1).
89. Edward E. Rhine et al., The Future of Parole Release, 46 CRIME & JUST. 279, 314 (2017).
90. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 2011).
91. PENAL § 3043.
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Victims who testify at parole hearings may also present evidence
about the crime itself. On its face, this evidence appears more valuable
to the Board than the types of evidence discussed above. Evidence regarding the crime will often relate to offender dangerousness and will,
in theory, help the Board better assess parole suitability. The same
goes for interactions between the inmate and the victim at the time of
the crime—facts which may be absent from the inmate’s file.
However, despite the seemingly helpful nature of this kind of testimony, studies show that victim memory of traumatic events becomes
severely distorted with time—particularly when multiple years have
passed since the incident.
The most significant evidence showing that victims often misremember key details of crimes that they witnessed or experienced years
ago stems from research in neuropsychology. Neuroscientists and psychologists refer to memories of traumatic events, like experiencing a
violent crime, as “flashbulb” memories. Multiple studies show that
these memories often become severely distorted by time92 and repeated recall.93 For example, one study that surveyed thousands of
New Yorkers about their memories of the Twin Towers’ collapse on
9/11 found that participants demonstrated poor recollection of the
event within one year. In fact, researchers found that one year after
9/11, participants reported memories about 9/11 that were inconsistent
with 40 percent of the memories they had described in their reports to
researchers just after the incident.94 After three years, the consistency
of memories sank to 50 percent.95 Critically, these memory studies
also show that subjects who report inconsistent memories about traumatic events also report high confidence in the beliefs that are

92. See, e.g., Michael McCloskey et al., Is There a Special Flashbulb-Memory Mechanism?,
117 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 171, 177 (1988). See generally Jennifer M. Talarico & David
C. Rubin, Confidence, Not Consistency, Characterizes Flashbulb Memories, 14 PSYCH. SCI. 455,
460 (2003) (finding significant decreases in the quality of flashbulb memories over time).
93. See generally Lia Kvavilashvili et al., Consistency of Flashbulb Memories of September
11 over Long Delays: Implications for Consolidation and Wrong Time Slice Hypotheses, 64 J.
MEMORY & LANGUAGE 556, 572 (2009) (discussing how recalling flashbulb memories can result
in “time slice errors” where persons conflate their experience recalling the event later with their
experiences of the event in question).
94. See generally William Hirst et al., Long-Term Memory for the Terrorist Attack of September 11: Flashbulb Memories, Event Memories, and the Factors That Influence Their Retention, 138
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 161, 161–67 (2009).
95. See generally id. Notably, participants better recalled their location at the time of the event
than their then contemporaneous feelings about it. Id. at 171, 173.
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inconsistent with what they reported experiencing at the time of the
event.96 This second finding shows that over time victim memories of
flashbulb events degrade, but confidence in those memories remains
high.
Other studies show that persons who experience flashbulb
memory events also (1) demonstrate “forward telescoping” biases,
which cause them to estimate that memories happened more recently
than they did;97 (2) forget essential details;98 (3) become easily tricked
into misremembering through suggestion;99 and (4) experience a variety of other memory distorting phenomena that impact recollection.100
Perhaps most disturbingly, research also shows that persons with
flashbulb memories come to remember flashbulb events as more traumatic and stressful than they really were.101 A study of combat veterans, which surveyed test subjects about traumatic events they had witnessed in combat, found that subjects recalled experiencing more
traumatic events when surveyed two years after the events than they
did when first questioned.102 The study asked subjects to mark boxes
if they had experienced a traumatic event in combat.103 The more
events the subject witnessed or experienced, the more boxes he or she
would fill in.104 The events all concerned unquestionably memorable
experiences like observing disfigured bodies, feeling an extreme threat
96. See, e.g., Talarico & Rubin, supra note 92, at 460 (finding that there is often a dissociation
between belief in the accuracy of flashbulb memories and the consistency of memories).
97. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Wesley Marburger, Since the Eruption of Mt. St. Helens, Has Anyone Beaten You Up? Improving the Accuracy of Retrospective Reports with Landmark Events, 11
MEMORY & COGNITION 114, 119 (1983) (“When people are asked about their experiences as crime
victims, they appear to exhibit a distortion of recollection in which the victimization appears to
have occurred more recently than it actually did.”). It is unclear whether flashbulb memories become even less reliable after 3 years.
98. Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. PSYCH. 518, 531–32
(1993) (discussing examples).
99. Id.
100. Stephen R. Schmidt, Autobiographical Memories for the September 11th Attacks: Reconstructive Errors and Emotional Impairment of Memory, 32 MEMORY & COGNITION 443, 452
(2004) (finding that college students who were asked about their experiences of 9/11 remembered
only “schematic highlights” of what occurred); cf. Alafair Burke et al., Remembering Emotional
Events, 20 MEMORY & COGNITION 277, 289 (1992) (discussing literature on how memory may be
impacted by emotional events).
101. Nathan H. Lents & Deryn Strange, Trauma, PTSD, and Memory Distortion, PSYCH.
TODAY (May 23, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/beastly-behavior/201605/trau
ma-ptsd-and-memory-distortion [https://perma.cc/HN9N-J3L5]; Steven M. Southwick et al., Consistency of Memory for Combat-Related Traumatic Events in Veterans of Operation Desert Storm,
154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 173, 173 (1997).
102. Southwick et al., supra note 101, at 175.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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to personal safety, experiencing a friend’s death, or taking sniper
fire.105 But despite the memorable nature of the events, the study found
that 88 percent of the subjects checked at least some different boxes
the second time they filled out the survey.106 Most importantly, 70 percent of subjects checked off more boxes representing traumatic events
in the second survey than they did in the initial survey.107
Parole hearings often occur fifteen to twenty years after the crime.
Although it is unclear whether flashbulb memories continue to erode
after two to three years, the evidence discussed above shows that even
if they do not, many victims begin to misremember critical aspects of
a crime long before an inmate’s first parole hearing. Because of this,
victim testimony at parole hearings will likely contain inaccuracies—
often through no fault of the victim. Therefore, victim testimony increases the risk that the Parole Board will use unreliable facts in their
assessments of inmate dangerousness.
Accordingly, even where victim testimony carries probative
value, it likely threatens the Board’s ability to assess offender dangerousness because of the unreliable nature of decades-old memories.
Given that prosecutors likely increase victim participation in the parole process, prosecutorial involvement in parole hearings, in its current form, likely has negative effects on the Board’s ability to determine offender dangerousness. By eliminating prosecutors from parole
hearings and decreasing victim participation, the Parole Directives
will likely improve the Board’s ability to assess dangerousness and
reduce the volume of unreliable or irrelevant evidence submitted to
the Board.108
2. Prosecutors as Attorneys for the State
Prosecutors do not just facilitate victim participation in parole.
Prosecutors also serve a separate role in the parole process when they
advocate on behalf of the state.109 For that reason, we must also consider whether prosecutors help the Board more accurately assess

105. Id. at 176.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 174.
108. To be clear, this Article does not advocate for the total exclusion of victims from the parole
process. Instead, it encourages adopting an approach more like that described in Rhine et al., supra
note 89, at 314.
109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.7 (West 2011).
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offender dangerousness when they speak only as representatives of the
state.
To ensure that the Board considers only relevant, reliable evidence from prosecutors representing the state, California courts provide guidelines regarding what prosecutors may say and what kind of
evidence the Board may consider in assessing inmate dangerousness.110
For example, In re Lawrence—which holds that the Board’s sole
purpose is to assess an inmate’s current dangerousness111—impliedly
directs the Board to ignore any statements by prosecutors that do not
relate to dangerousness.112 In the same vein, cases like Hernandez v.
Subia113 and others instruct the Board not to deny parole when a prosecutor opposes release without reliable evidence to support a finding
that the prisoner poses a risk to society.114
The legislature has also taken steps to increase the reliability of
evidence that prosecutors offer to the Board. Specifically, section
2030 of the California Code of Regulations bars prosecutors from
providing comments or opinions about the inmate or the inmate’s suitability for parole if not “support[ed by] documentation in the [prisoner’s] file.”115
These guidelines seem to ensure that prosecutors who attend parole hearings on behalf of the state do not introduce unreliable evidence into the parole process. However, a closer look shows that including prosecutors in the parole process as advocates of the state
creates other problems which may offset any benefits obtained by including prosecutors at parole hearings.
While most prosecutors fairly represent facts and present only reliable evidence to the Board, the lack of enforcement measures for
guidelines like section 2030 and In re Lawrence ensure that less scrupulous prosecutors have few reasons to comply with these rules.
110. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
111. In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 549 (Cal. 2008).
112. Id. (“In sum, the Penal Code and corresponding regulations establish that the fundamental
consideration in parole decisions is public safety . . . , and our discussion in both Rosenkrantz and
Dannenberg emphasized this point. Moreover, it is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the
core determination of “public safety” under the statute and corresponding regulations involves an
assessment of an inmate’s current dangerousness.” (citations omitted)).
113. No. 07-cv-00839, 2010 WL 2025330 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2010).
114. See id. at *15 (stating that a prosecutor’s opposition to parole without other reliable evidence does not provide a basis to deny parole) (quoting Rosenkrantz v. Marshall, 444 F. Supp. 2d
1063, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2006)).
115. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2030 (1990).
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For one, section 2030 provides no mechanism for inmates or their
attorneys to object to improper statements. The effect is that inmates
lack procedural tools to strike prejudicial comments from the record
unless a Board member admonishes the prosecutor.116
Other tools to keep prosecutors in check at parole hearings, like
civil lawsuits, state bar discipline and employer discipline, and the appellate process, often come up short as well. With respect to civil suits,
prosecutors possess immunity for misconduct in the parole process.117
Accordingly, civil lawsuits provide little incentive for prosecutors to
comply with procedures.
Second, the threat of state bar discipline and adverse employment
action also offer only a specter of a threat for those who engage in
misconduct. State bars and prosecutors’ offices nationwide have faced
withering criticism for lax enforcement policies and for failing to hold
prosecutors accountable for misconduct.118 For example, a scathing
review of over 11,000 cases by Chicago Tribune journalists found that
prosecutors routinely violated ethical duties but suffered little to no
consequences.119 Judges have joined in the criticism, too, with at least
one high profile judge calling out prosecutorial misconduct in the
United States as a problem on the scale of an “epidemic.”120 Legal
scholars who study this question have reached similar conclusions,
116. In my review of parole transcripts, I did not encounter even one case where this occurred.
117. California statutory law and federal common law bar suits against prosecutors for statements at parole hearings. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 845.8 (West 2012) (interpreted to provide prosecutors with immunity from state law claims for statements made in parole hearings); Thomas v.
Treisman, No. F068936, 2015 WL 729307, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2015) (applying absolute
immunity from federal claims to prosecutor executing duties at parole hearing); Brown v. Cal.
Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying absolute immunity from federal claims
to prosecutors functioning in their official capacities).
118. Karen McDonald Henning, The Failed Legacy of Absolute Immunity Under Imbler:
Providing a Compromise Approach to Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 219,
242 (2012) (discussing the failure of state bars to prevent and hold prosecutors accountable for
misconduct); David Leonhardt, Two Men, Two Decades, No Evidence, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/16/briefing/winter-storm-adam-kinzinger-pelosi-congress.h
tml [https://perma.cc/26B3-CYD6] (discussing lack of consequences for Mississippi prosecutor
who was determined by the Supreme Court of the United States to have discriminated on the basis
of race in jury selection in the case of Curtis Flowers, an exonerated death row inmate); Parker
Yesko, Will Doug Evans Face Accountability?, APM REPORTS (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.apm
reports.org/story/2020/10/14/will-doug-evans-face-accountability
[https://perma.cc/D9WNBBHR] (discussing how prosecutors succeed in evading accountability for misconduct).
119. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., (Jan. 11, 1999,
2:00 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/chi-020103trial1-story.html [https://per
ma.cc/X9PB-MHHS].
120. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)
(“There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land. Only judges can put a stop to it.”).
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with some describing the due process checks on prosecutors as “paper
tigers” because of lax enforcement.121 These findings suggest that adverse employment action by prosecutors’ offices and state bar discipline do not guarantee that prosecutors will comply with restrictions
like section 2030—making it ever more important that section 2030
carries an enforcement mechanism.
In addition, the appellate and habeas process provide few safeguards to protect inmates from prosecutorial errors and misconduct at
parole hearings. California courts review grants and denials of parole
under the highly deferential “some evidence” standard.122 Under this
standard, courts do not overturn the Board’s decisions on parole suitability unless no reliable evidence supports the Board’s finding.123 As
a result, even where a prosecutor makes a demonstrably false or prejudicial statement, the court will not reverse the Board’s decision as
long as the Board lists a permissible rationale for denying or granting
parole.124 This makes it nearly impossible to reverse parole denial
even in the most extraordinary cases of prosecutor error or misconduct.125
If prosecutors substantially improved the parole process when
they attended parole hearings and complied with section 2030 and In
re Lawrence, perhaps the risks described above would be offset by
benefits. However, when prosecutors comply with section 2030 and
case law, they provide little to no tangible benefit to the parole process
121. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations:
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 742 (1987) (determining that prosecutors frequently go unpunished when they violate Brady rules); cf. Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to
Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 278 (2007) (analogizing prosecutorial
misconduct to speeding and pointing out that the number of tickets given, just like the number of
disciplinary hearings for prosecutors, likely underestimates rates of prosecutorial misconduct).
122. See, e.g., In re Shippman, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 326, 333 (Ct. App. 2010).
123. Rosenkrantz v. Marshall, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“The some evidence standard is satisfied if there is any reliable evidence in the record that could support the
conclusion reached.”).
124. Cf. id. at 1079 (“The ‘some evidence’ standard is satisfied if there is any reliable evidence
in the record that could support the conclusion reached.”).
125. Highlighting the lack of accountability for prosecutors in this context, at least one court
has even questioned whether prosecutorial misconduct at a parole hearing entitles inmates to bring
claims for violation of due process. Priest v. Haviland, No. CIV S-09-2979, 2011 WL 666895, at
*2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011) (“Prosecutorial misconduct violates due process when it has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Petitioner has not cited
any case law which applies these laws to the conduct of a prosecutor who attends a parole suitability hearing.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). This court’s suggestion that it is not clear
whether prosecutorial misconduct at parole hearings can give rise to a due process claim is mere
dicta, and almost certainly incorrect. Nonetheless, it evidences the court system’s lack of interest
in monitoring the parole process.
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because under section 2030 prosecutors may only comment on evidence in the inmate’s file, i.e., evidence that the Board already has.126
Moreover, prosecutorial misconduct carries severe implications for inmates, who may spend as long as fifteen extra years in prison due to a
prosecutor’s indiscretion or error.127
Thus, sending prosecutors to parole hearings as advocates of the
state, whether they frequently oppose or support parole, creates significant risks. Most importantly though, those risks are not offset by any
quantifiable benefit. As a result, prosecutors probably do not improve
the parole process when they attend hearings as advocates of the state.
C. Sending Prosecutors to Parole Hearings to Read Victim
Testimony Sets Up a Conflict Between Section 2030 of the California
Code of Regulations and Section 3043 of the California Penal Code
One little-explored issue that arises when prosecutors attending
parole hearings to read victim testimony is whether doing so causes
prosecutors to violate section 2030 of the California Code of Regulations. As noted in Sections II.A and III.B.2, a prosecutor who attends
a parole hearing must not make statements about the inmate that go
beyond facts in the inmate’s file.128 However, victims are not bound
by such restrictions and may make statements about evidence not included in the inmate’s file.129 This puts prosecutors in a precarious
position when they read victim statements or state victim opinions as
doing so may result in prosecutors providing evidence to the Board
that goes beyond evidence in the inmate’s file.
While this Article did not uncover any case law addressing this
problem, it is something that prosecutors’ offices in California should
consider carefully before allowing prosecutors to read victim testimony under the Penal Code.
D. We Do Not Know Whether Prosecutors Help Victims by
Increasing Victim Participation in the Parole Process
Another critical question to consider in assessing whether prosecutors play a valuable role in the parole process is whether they

126.
127.
128.
129.

See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2030 (1990).
Lifer Parole Process, supra note 79 (listing length of parole denials).
REGS. tit. 15, § 2030.
See supra Section III.B.1.
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improve victim satisfaction and victim healing by increasing the contact that victims have with the justice system.
Unfortunately, little empirical research addresses this question.130
Accordingly, this section considers research on similar matters—victim participation in sentencing—to determine whether increased victim participation in the criminal legal process benefits victims.
In many states and the federal courts, victims have expansive
rights to submit victim impact statements before sentencing.131 The
statements that victims submit at sentencing resemble those offered at
parole hearings. The following section takes the submission of statements at sentencing to be an analog for the same action at a parole
hearing.132
Proponents of victim participation in sentencing and victim participation in parole argue that allowing victims to speak at sentencing
hearings and parole hearings promotes psychological healing and increases victim satisfaction with the criminal legal process.133 By contrast, opponents argue that victims gain little from increased participation in the legal process and victims experience adverse effects from
increased contact with offenders.134 Frustratingly, even though

130. Morgan & Smith, supra note 53, at 338.
131. Roberts, supra note 57, at 349 (discussing how victim testimony may impact board decisions). Please note too that I will not consider the benefits to victims provided by restorative justice
initiatives where victims confront and engage in dialogue with offenders. The reason I do not compare these programs to victim participation in the parole process is that victim participation in the
parole process does not involve the victim engaging in a dialogue with the offender but rather presenting testimony to the board. Thus it is dissimilar from restorative justice type initiatives.
132. Note that this analogy may be limited. The sentencing process is different from the parole
process and the findings of studies concerning sentencing do not always mesh with the findings of
studies that concern parole—even when it seems like they should. Compare Morgan & Smith, supra note 53, at 333 (finding that victim statements impact parole board decisions), with Edwin
Villmoare & Virginia V. Neto, Victim Appearances at Sentencing Hearings Under the California
Victims’ Bill of Rights, NAT’L INST. JUST. 61 (Mar. 1987), https://perma.cc/TFG2-MLSE (finding
that victim statements to courts do not usually impact sentencing decisions).
133. Dean G. Kilpatrick & Randy K. Otto, Constitutionally Guaranteed Participation in Criminal Proceedings for Victims: Potential Effects on Psychological Functioning, 34 WAYNE L. REV.
7, 8 (1987).
134. Roberts, supra note 57, at 366 (“Critics claim . . . that victims are unlikely to benefit from
submitting a statement.”); see also Polyvictims: Victims’ Rights Enforcement as a Tool to Mitigate
“Secondary Victimization” in the Criminal Justice System, NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST. 2 (Mar.
2013), https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/13797-ncvlipvvictims-rights-enforcement-as-a-tool-to [http
s://perma.cc/2767-7LC3] (finding that certain victims will experience “revictimization” if they participate extensively in the criminal justice process).
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scholars have studied this issue extensively, there is no consensus on
who is right.135
For example, some research concludes that victims obtain significant benefits from speaking at sentencing hearings.136 But, just as
many studies show the opposite: that victims obtain little to no benefit
from participating in the sentencing process.137
Problematically, a comprehensive meta-analysis of empirical
studies on victim satisfaction with the criminal legal system found “severe” methodological flaws in most of the studies addressing these
questions. Defects included failure to control for malingering among
study participants, inadequate samples, and the use of dubious markers
of correlation.138 Correspondingly, the review’s authors found that literature on the impact of victim participation in the criminal legal process did not permit “definite conclusions to be drawn and prevent[ed]
recommendations for practice and policy” on whether victims benefit
from participating in the criminal legal process.139
These findings prevent this Article from reaching a conclusion on
whether victims benefit from participating in the parole process. As a
result, the Article takes no position on whether an increase in the rate
of victim participation in parole hearings positively or negatively impacts victims.140
E. Excluding Deputy District Attorneys from Parole Hearings Will
Free Up Prosecutors to Perform Other Tasks
Some critics of George Gascón’s reforms worry that his reformminded approach to criminal law will result in dangerous offenders

135. See generally Maarten Kunst et al., Victim Satisfaction with the Criminal Justice System
and Emotional Recovery: A Systematic and Critical Review of the Literature, 16 TRAUMA,
VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 336 (2015).
136. Roberts, supra note 57, at 366–70 (listing multiple studies that found that most victims
who submitted victim impact statements would do so again).
137. See Amanda Konradi, “I Don’t Have to Be Afraid of You”: Rape Survivors’ Emotion Management in Court, 22 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 45, 50 (1999) (discussing the range of traumatic
emotions rape victims may experience when they participate in the criminal justice process); cf.
Villmoare & Neto, supra note 132, at 60 (“Six out of 10 victims who expressed their opinions to
the sentencing court . . . had positive feelings afterwards. However, these participants were no more
likely to feel satisfied than victims who took little or no action.”).
138. Kunst et al., supra note 135, at 354–55.
139. Id. at 355 (“[A]ll studies included in this review suffered from rather severe methodological shortcomings as indicated by the Cambridge Quality Checklists.” (citation omitted)).
140. The author encourages others to explore this issue in more detail.
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evading conviction.141 However, this criticism neglects to consider
that cutting prosecutors out of the parole process will likely allow the
District Attorney’s Office to dedicate thousands of additional hours to
prosecuting cases. This, in turn, may help increase public safety.
Parole suitability hearings usually take about two hours.142 Prosecutors who attend ordinarily stay for the duration of hearings.143 Before attending hearings, prosecutors review evidence; draft letters to
the Board; and, where victims wish to attend, spend time conferencing
with victims.144
The Board reached a disposition in 7,684 cases in 2020.145 Of the
7,684 cases before the board, 2,131 involved an inmate committed in
Los Angeles.146 Out of the 2,131 cases in Los Angeles, 1,108 involved
defendants with charges stemming from Los Angeles County only.147
If the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office sent a prosecutor
to each hearing and if the only time the prosecutor spent on the hearing
was the time spent advocating before the Board, the office would dedicate approximately 2,216 hours of labor to parole suitability hearings—assuming an average hearing length of two hours.148

141. See White, supra note 11 (quoting prosecutors who oppose Gascón’s reforms on the
ground that they prevent the DA’s office from holding offenders “accountable” and “damag[e] the
community”).
142. See, e.g., In re Parole Consideration Hearing of Harvey Amezcua at 3:5, 77:13, CDC No.
V69723 (Pelican Bay State Prison Nov. 3, 2020) (2 hours and 26 minutes); see also, e.g., In re
Parole Consideration Hearing of Brian Allen at 3:6, 81:4, CDC No. J6200 (Cal. Men’s Colony
Nov. 20, 2020) (1 hour and 44 minutes); In re Parole Consideration Hearing of Edward Earl Allen
at 3:5, 50:8, CDC No. B81763 (Cal. State Prison, Sacramento Nov. 17, 2020) (1 hour and 30
minutes); In re Parole Consideration Hearing of Leobardo Blancarte at 3:6, 97:8, CDC No. V12853
(Valley State Prison Nov. 6, 2020) (2 hours and 4 minutes). Average hearing length was 1 hour and
56 minutes.
143. Prosecutors must appear at the beginning of the hearing to introduce themselves for the
record. They also have the power to make the final comments at the hearing. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3043.6 (West 2011).
144. Inside LADA, supra note 1 (discussing prosecutors’ usual functions in the parole process).
145. Calendar Year 2020 Suitability Results, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., https://www.
cdcr.ca.gov/bph/2020/03/04/cy-2020-suitability-results/ [https://perma.cc/7BAL-6D7N].
146. The following lists the number of inmate parole hearings held in 2020 that concerned inmates committed in Los Angeles County. In the month of January 2020, the Board held 205 lifer
parole hearings concerning inmates committed in Los Angeles; in February 2020, 168; in March
2020, 181; in April, 189; in May, 136; in June, 181; in July, 225; in August, 152; in September,
190; in October, 190; in November, 123; and in December, 191. Parole Suitability Hearing Results,
supra note 72. If any records have been removed, see the Wayback Machine archive for records.
WAYBACK MACH., supra note 72.
147. See Master List of Parole Hearings in Los Angeles (2020) (on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review).
148. Calculation based on the number of parole hearings of persons committed in Los Angeles
in 2020 (1,108) multiplied by two hours per hearing. This amounts to 2,216 hours.
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Suppose we add to this estimate the hours that prosecutors spend
preparing for hearings. In that case—even if prosecutors spend just
four hours per hearing drafting, reading, conferencing, and traveling—
prosecutors devote a total of six hours to each hearing.149 Multiplying
that number times the number of parole hearings involving inmates
committed in Los Angeles County, produces a result of 6,648 hours.150
Freeing up several thousand hours of time will help the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office focus on its primary responsibilities—prosecuting cases and obtaining plea deals. The Los Angeles
County District Attorney’s Office processes over 71,000 felony cases
and 112,000 misdemeanor cases per year.151 Overworked prosecutors
make more errors and oversights than prosecutors with time to review
evidence more carefully.152 According to a 2010 study, a single criminal trial can cost up to $44,000.153 Where a prosecutor’s mistake or
oversight results in a reversal on appeal, the case will likely double in
cost because of the retrial. In other words, errors have significant consequences.
Considering the costs associated with prosecutorial mistakes at
trial and the strains placed on the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, reducing the role prosecutors play in the parole process
may benefit the Los Angeles County criminal legal system by freeing
up prosecutors to focus more closely on their caseloads.
F. Sheriff’s Deputies Will Not Negate the Effects of Gascón’s Policy
After George Gascón instituted the Parole Directives, Los Angeles County Sheriff Alex Villanueva, who disapproved of the changes,
proposed sending deputy sheriffs to parole hearings to replace

149. I do not have access to any reliable figures estimating how long deputy district attorneys
spend preparing to attend parole hearings. But an estimate of four hours is likely on the low side
given that prosecutors may need to travel to and from the prison where the hearing is held, prepare
a letter, and meet with victims.
150. Calculated by multiplying the number of parole hearings involving inmates committed in
Los Angeles (1,108) by six.
151. Operations, L.A. CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., https://da.lacounty.gov/operations [https://
perma.cc/C7MJ-QJ3E].
152. See JENNIFER WYATT BOURGEOIS ET AL., AN EXAMINATION OF PROSECUTORIAL STAFF,
BUDGETS, CASELOADS AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE 4 (2019), https://assets-global.websitefiles.com/5ef1f236f51b59892a5aec87/5f5e0ad483b2a17b9fdd26a4_ProsecutorWorkload%20Rep
ort.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AW6-QWGZ].
153. First Estimates of Judicial Costs of Specific Crimes, from Homicide to Theft, RAND CORP.
(Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.rand.org/news/press/2016/09/12.html [https://perma.cc/X7CV-YV
2B].
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prosecutors.154 As a result of this intervention, one might argue that
the Parole Directives will have little practical effect on the parole process because deputy sheriffs will take on the role of prosecutors. However, California law will only allow sheriff’s deputies to attend in a
limited number of cases. For that reason, sending sheriff’s deputies to
parole hearings will probably not negate the intended effects of Gascón’s reforms.
For one, sheriff’s deputies may never attend parole hearings as
representatives of the state.155 While they may submit written statements to the Board regarding parole suitability,156 section 3041.7 of
the California Penal Code bars anyone but “the prosecutor of the
county from which the inmate was committed” from representing the
state at a parole hearing.157
In a more limited context, section 2029.1 of the California Code
of Regulations permits any person to attend a parole hearing for “educational and informational” purposes, provided they receive authorization.158 However, Villanueva’s letter to the Los Angeles County
District Attorney’s Office states that deputies will attend hearings to
give victims a “voice[,]”159 not for educational purposes. Accordingly,
deputies may not participate in parole hearings under this provision.160
Section 3043.1 of the California Penal Code allows a victim who
attends a parole hearing to be accompanied by “one person of his or
her own choosing . . . for support[.]”161 Section 3043.1 will allow deputies to attend hearings in a limited number of cases. However, their
presence will have little impact on parole outcomes because the statute
only allows attendees to appear, not testify.162
The only provision that will allow deputies to appear and testify
before the Board is section 3043. As discussed in Section II.B, section
3043 allows “any adult person” to appear as a representative of the
154. LA County Sheriffs (@LASDHQ), supra note 13; see Letter from Alex Villanueva to
George Gascón, supra note 13.
155. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.7 (West 2011).
156. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2028(a) (1990).
157. PENAL § 3041.7. Note that in a limited set of cases the California Attorney General may
replace the District Attorney at a parole hearing to represent the interests of the state. Id.
158. REGS. tit. 15, § 2029.1.
159. See LA County Sheriffs (@LASDHQ), supra note 13.
160. REGS. tit. 15, § 2029.1. Even if the Board allows deputies to participate in hearings under
this provision, deputies will not be permitted to make any comments. Section 2029.1 allows persons
to attend but not speak. Id. (“Visitors and observers may not participate in the hearing except to
review written records as permitted by law.”).
161. PENAL § 3043.1.
162. Id.

(8) 55.2_MURCIA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

PROSECUTORS, PAROLE, AND EVIDENCE

5/5/22 2:05 PM

475

victim and to speak or read testimony on the victim’s behalf.163 However, a representative’s power to come before the Board under this
provision comes into being only if the victim designates the person as
a representative.164 In contrast to section 2030, which allows prosecutors to speak at any parole hearing, this provision will only allow deputy sheriffs to speak at a limited number of hearings.
The Sheriff’s Department also states on its website that deputies
will not attend parole hearings unless the inmate’s case was investigated by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department.165 This restriction further limits the number of cases that the office may attend
and, thus, the effect that deputies will have on parole hearings.
Accordingly, even if Villanueva continues to follow through on
this policy, he will only succeed in placing deputies in hearings when
victims (1) want to be involved in the parole process, (2) victims also
take the affirmative step of designating the Sheriff’s Department as
their representative, and (3) the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department previously investigated the case. The Policy will impact only a
small number of cases and will probably not have a significant impact
on the parole process.
IV. CONCLUSION: GASCÓN’S PAROLE DIRECTIVES WILL LIKELY
IMPROVE THE PAROLE PROCESS
This Article addressed whether sending prosecutors to parole
hearings compromises or improves the parole process and whether excluding prosecutors from parole hearings will improve the criminal
legal system more generally. A review of empirical literature in Section III.A.1 showed that prosecutorial involvement in the parole process correlates positively with a condition, victim participation, that
decreases inmate release rates. The Article also determined that prosecutorial attendance at parole hearings does not help the Board assess
offender dangerousness.166 These findings alone show that prosecutorial participation in the parole process probably does not improve the
parole system’s effectiveness.
The Article determined that data does not present a clear picture
of whether prosecutorial involvement in the parole process benefits or
163. Id. § 3043(c).
164. Id. § 3043(b)(2).
165. Victim Representation at Parole Hearings, L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, https://lasd.org/
parole-hearing-victim-representation [https://perma.cc/38PK-MKSU].
166. See discussion supra Sections III.A–C.
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harms victims—an issue that should be studied further. It also concluded that when prosecutors attend parole hearings on behalf of victims, they may violate their obligations under section 2030 of the California Code of Regulations.167
In terms of the Parole Directives’ likely effects on the criminal
legal system more generally, the Article determined that the Parole
Directives will likely help relieve the workload placed on Los Angeles
County’s prosecutors.168 The evidence discussed in section III.A.3
showed that the Parole Directives may also help California reduce
overcrowding in prisons.169
Based on the empirical findings discussed above, the Article
reaches the overall conclusion that Gascón’s Parole Directives will
likely improve California’s parole process and have small but beneficial effects on other areas of California’s criminal legal system.

167. See discussion supra Section III.C.
168. See discussion supra Section III.E.
169. See discussion supra Section III.A.3.iii.

